AI, Work and the Economy

Our view

What we think is happening

AI is making machine work cheap, and what machines cannot make dear. Its first effects are a squeeze: on the pay and hiring of people entering office work, on pay's share of income, and on capital, power and sites. We think that squeeze, with money already dear, brings a downturn about the size of 2001's; that the office jobs cut in it are not all refilled; and that afterwards the public response decides how far the damage goes.

The view and its predictions were set on 13 Nov 2026. The same view, in the model's repository

The mark beside each point is its status in the current assessment, written by Claude, an AI model, on 15 Nov 2026 under written rules for what may move a point. It may depart from our own view.

4.1%
the Federal Reserve's rate at its high, in early 2027, from 3.9% in September 2026
6.2%
US unemployment at its high in the downturn, in early 2029, from 4.2%
8.6%
of the US workforce out of work by mid-2032, and still rising

What the model shows if this view is right. The run, by date

Sixteen predictions were set on 13 Nov 2026. All are still open. The next deadline falls in Jun 2027: Technology stocks. All the indicators

Each prediction below is drawn as a track. Its right end is the threshold our view predicts; its left end is the reading that would count against our view or, for a signal of a downturn, where the measure started. The line marks where it stood when the prediction was set, the dot its latest reading.

Now: the squeeze 2026–27

1

AI can already do much office work, and its price is falling

Under way

On tests of whole tasks, the length and difficulty of the work AI systems finish unaided has kept rising, and the price of a given level of ability has kept falling. Machines have stayed dear partly because people build them: in the US national accounts for 2023, pay for work is still 47% of what it costs to build equipment, software and buildings, counting the work all the way down the supply chain. AI that writes software, designs chips and runs data centres could lower that share.

In the model's run. The model does not compute this point. It takes what AI can do as given, through the pace at which AI replaces jobs (point 2).

What would count against it. A year without progress on tests of whole tasks, or prices for a given task that stop falling.

2

Firms hire fewer people for that work; the loss of jobs is small and growing

Early signs

Firms appear to use AI first to hire fewer people and to thin office layers, and people entering office work are the first affected. On the US jobs data from September 2024, when employment among 25–54-year-olds peaked, to August 2026, the net loss of jobs to AI is at most 0.2% of the workforce a year, and the trend itself cannot be told from zero. Job growth has come from health care and social assistance: from Aug 2024 to Aug 2026 they added 102% of the net growth in US jobs, while the rest of the economy shed jobs.

In the model's run. The run starts from that upper limit and doubles it every two years: 0.3% of the workforce a year by late 2027, 0.4% by late 2028 and 0.9% by late 2030, and never more than 1%. The doubling time is assumed, not measured, and the later years depend on it more than on anything else. Of the people AI displaces in the United States, 59% are taken to leave the workforce, the middle of three measurements (18–94%).

What would count against it. Office jobs growing in line with other jobs, graduates' unemployment falling back against that of others, and employment among 25–54-year-olds recovering.

Dated predictions

  • Private jobs outside careJobs added over a year: 424 thousand in Oct 2026
    Against our view at 1,078 thousandThreshold zero or below
    Openby Oct 2027
  • Office jobsTheir growth minus that of all jobs: −0.50 points in Oct 2026
    Against our view at 0.04 pointsThreshold −2.41 points or below
    Openby Oct 2028
  • People leaving the workforceTwo-year change in the employment rate: −0.30 points in Oct 2026
    Against our view at 0.77 pointsThreshold −0.40 points or below
    Openby Oct 2028

Also watched

Latest news on this point

3

Income is moving from pay to owners

Early signs

Labour's share of US business output is the lowest since records began in 1947. It has fallen 3.2 points since the second quarter of 2023, about a point a year, while output in the business sector grew 3.0% a year and hours worked 0.2%. So far the change has come through pay and hiring. In our view it reaches jobs later.

In the model's run. The model does not compute income shares. This point is followed in the data.

What would count against it. The share recovering outside a recession.

4

Capital, power and sites are scarce, so borrowing stays dear

Under way

The build-out of AI computing costs more than its builders earn, and they are borrowing to pay for it while long-term interest rates are at their highest in more than fifteen years. The ten-year US Treasury yield reached 5.31% on 5 Oct 2026, its highest since May 2002, and the yield on inflation-protected ten-year Treasuries 2.95% the same day, its highest since Nov 2008. Grid connections, sites and permits limit what can be built, so the money raises the price of what is scarce.

In the model's run. The model has no long-term interest rate and no market for power or sites. It carries the squeeze in one way: core inflation starts at 3.0%, above the Federal Reserve's target, and fades at the pace it has faded since 2024. So the Federal Reserve raises its rate a little further, from 3.9% to 4.1% in early 2027. Without that inflation the model would have had it cutting from the start, to 3.4% by mid-2027. If inflation rose again instead of fading, the rate would go much higher: 7.2% with a second wave of three points.

What would count against it. Long-term interest rates falling back while the build-out speeds up, or its weaker borrowers funding themselves freely again.

Next: the downturn 2027–29

5

Dear money and a retreat from AI's weaker borrowers bring a downturn

Not yet seen

We think the squeeze ends as lenders and investors retreat from the firms that depend on outside money to build AI computing, and that share prices lose about half as much as in the dot-com crash, over two and a half years from their high of 6 Oct 2026. Households that own shares spend less, credit gets dearer, and unemployment rises about as far as it did after the dot-com crash.

In the model's run. US households' shares are 22% down at the bottom. US unemployment rises from 4.2% to 5.2% by the end of 2027 and 6.2% in early 2029; the Sahm rule, a rise of half a point in its three-month average, triggers in July 2027. The Federal Reserve cuts from the third quarter of 2027, to 2.7% by the end of 2028. The four economies' output is 2.3% below what they could produce at the worst of the downturn, in early 2029.

What would count against it. No rise in unemployment by the end of 2027, or a fall in shares and credit that reverses while the build-out is paid for out of its builders' own cash.

Dated predictions

  • Technology stocksThe Nasdaq's fall from its high: −13.5% on 19 Nov 2026
    Started at −8.1%Threshold −20.0% or below
    Openby 30 Jun 2027
  • US mortgage arrearsYearly change in the arrears rate: 0.08 points in Q2 2026
    Started at 0.08 pointsThreshold 0.40 points or above
    Openby Q3 2027
  • US unemploymentRise above its low of the past year: 0.00 points in Oct 2026
    Started at 0.00 pointsThreshold 0.50 points or above
    Openby Sep 2027
  • Financial stressThe index: −0.87 on 13 Nov 2026
    Started at −0.49Threshold 1.00 or above
    Openby 24 Sep 2027
  • Bank lending to non-bank lenders13-week change: 4.8% on 11 Nov 2026
    Started at 4.7%Threshold −3.0% or below
    Openby 29 Sep 2027
  • Corporate creditThree-month change in the extra yield: −0.08 points on 19 Nov 2026
    Started at −0.13 pointsThreshold 0.56 points or above
    Openby 30 Sep 2027
  • Swedish unemploymentRise above its low of the past year: 0.10 points in Oct 2026
    Started at 0.27 pointsThreshold 0.60 points or above
    Openby Dec 2027
  • US jobless claimsRise above their low of the past year: 1.3% on 14 Nov 2026
    Started at 0.0%Threshold 25.0% or above
    Openby 25 Dec 2027
  • Korea's exportsYearly change: 84.7% in Sep 2026
    Started at 67.8%Threshold zero or below
    Openby Jun 2028

How a retreat would travel

  1. 3Investors pull back from firms that live on outside moneyOn
  2. 4Lenders follow and become selectiveNot yet
  3. 5Investment, wealth, spending and jobsNot yet

Two of the four steps that public data can show are on: steps 2 and 3. The five steps and their measures

Also watched

Latest news on this point

6

The jobs cut in it do not all come back

Not yet seen

In past downturns most of the jobs cut were filled again when demand returned. We think that this time firms automate part of the office work they cut. The public response comes late, because it waits for unemployment to rise.

In the model's run. Each quarter, firms automate 5% of the jobs cut in the downturn and do not refill them. Governments add stimulus once unemployment has risen two points, which in the United States is April 2029. Unemployment then falls back to 4.7% by the third quarter of 2030. The share of the workforce out of work, which counts those who have left it, falls no lower than 5.3%, against 4.2% at the start.

What would count against it. Office employment back at its level before the downturn within two years of its low.

Dated predictions

  • US hiringYearly change in continuing claims: −9.5% on 7 Nov 2026
    Started at −12.8%Threshold 10.0% or above
    Openby 25 Sep 2027
  • Permanent job lossesYearly change in their share of the unemployed: −1.9 points in Oct 2026
    Started at −1.9 pointsThreshold 5.0 points or above
    Openby Mar 2028

Also watched

Latest news on this point

Later: cheap machine work 2029–32

7

Afterwards AI replaces jobs faster, and the response decides the outcome

Early signs

After the downturn we expect AI to replace jobs faster, in office work first. Robots doing physical work at scale would add to it; we do not expect them within this period. By then interest rates are low, and what governments do decides how far the damage goes: support incomes and tax the rents that scarcity creates, or cut spending and raise tariffs.

In the model's run. By mid-2032, 8.6% of the US workforce is out of work and the share is still rising: 7.4% unemployed and 1.1% who have left the workforce. The Federal Reserve's rate is 1.8%. If AI replaced jobs no faster than it has so far, 5.8% would be out of work; if the pace doubled every year, 10.1%. With spending cuts, tariffs and no bank rescues, 17.7%, with output 17% below what the economies could produce. With an income guarantee, 7.9%.

What would count against it. A pace of job losses to AI that is still at today's upper limit in 2029.

The model's run of this view

The model starts from the economies as measured to the end of September 2026 and runs month by month to June 2032. It shows what follows from the view's settings. It is not a forecast. Run the model yourself

Early 2027
The Federal Reserve's rate reaches its high, 4.1%.
By 30 Jun 2027
The Nasdaq is 20% or more below its high of the past year.
July 2027
US unemployment has risen half a point above its low of the past year (the Sahm rule).
The end of 2027
US unemployment is 5.2%, from 4.2% in September 2026.
The end of 2028
US unemployment is 5.9%; the Federal Reserve's rate is down to 2.7%.
Early 2029
US unemployment reaches 6.2%, its high in the downturn; the four economies' output is 2.3% below what they could produce.
April 2029
The US government's stimulus starts, once unemployment has risen two points.
The third quarter of 2030
US unemployment is back to 4.7%; 5.3% of the workforce is out of work, counting those who have left it.
Mid-2032
8.6% of the US workforce is out of work, and the share is still rising; the Federal Reserve's rate is 1.8%.
United States: the unemployment rate, and everyone out of work, % of the workforce

Before the model starts: the unemployment rate as measured. People who have left the workforce are not counted in the unemployment rate.

United States: the Federal Reserve's rate and core inflation, %

Before the model starts: the federal funds rate, and core prices of consumer spending over a year.

The runs around it

Each changes one part of the view and keeps the rest. None is a forecast.

Americans out of work, by how fast AI replaces jobs, %

Out of work counts the unemployed and those who have left the workforce after losing a job to AI.

Americans out of work, by the size of the fall in shares, %

Out of work counts the unemployed and those who have left the workforce after losing a job to AI.

Americans out of work, by how governments respond, %

Out of work counts the unemployed and those who have left the workforce after losing a job to AI.

The runUS unemployment, end of 2028US out of work, mid-2032Four economies' output at its worstOutcome
Our view5.9%8.6%, rising−4.0% mid-2032A deep recession
No fall in shares: the build-out's funding holds4.9%6.2%, rising−1.8% the end of 2030A recession
A fall in shares the size of the dot-com crash5.0%9.6%, rising−5.4% mid-2032A deep recession
A fall half as large again as the dot-com crash5.8%10.8%−7.0% the end of 2031A deep recession
AI replaces no jobs outside the downturn5.5%4.3%, rising−2.4% the third quarter of 2029A recession
AI replaces jobs no faster than it has so far5.7%5.8%, rising−2.6% mid-2032A recession
The pace doubles every year6.1%10.1%, rising−4.9% mid-2032A deep recession
Firms automate twice as many of the jobs they cut6.0%9.3%, rising−4.4% mid-2032A deep recession
Robots do physical work from late 20295.9%9.5%, rising−3.7% early 2032A recession
An income guarantee5.5%7.9%, rising−3.3% mid-2032A recession
More care jobs, paid for by borrowing4.0%7.5%, rising−3.3% mid-2032A recession
Spending cuts, tariffs and no bank rescues7.6%17.7%, rising−16.9% mid-2032A labour depression
The better case: funding holds and the pace stays as it is4.7%5.7%, rising−1.8% early 2032A slowdown
The worse case: a dot-com-sized fall, with spending cuts and tariffs8.7%21.4%, rising−21.2% mid-2032A depression

Output is measured against what the four economies could produce, a quarter's average. The outcome names the whole run, to mid-2032, by its worst point. Each run opens in the model.

The other economies in the run, and why we do not rest on them
Out of work, end of 2027End of 2028Mid-2032Output at its worst
United States5.3%6.1%8.6%−3.8%
Euro area outside France6.6%7.6%9.4%−3.7%
France9.0%10.3%14.2%−5.0%
Sweden9.5%10.5%15.7%−7.7%
China5.3%5.5%6.4%−4.2%

The view is stated for the United States. The model has no exchange rates, and it reads inflation a little under target as a heavier burden of debt, so it overstates the damage in Sweden and France, where inflation starts below target. A falling krona cushioned Sweden in 1931 and in 2008–09.

If inflation does not fade

In the 1970s unemployment and inflation rose together. Our view has inflation fading as unemployment rises. This is the main way the squeeze could go further than we think.

We expect inflation to fade for three reasons. Pay is not running ahead of prices: labour's share of income is falling. Over the year to Q3 2026, output per hour rose 2.1% and pay per hour after inflation rose 1.0%. The downturn we expect comes from lost spending, which lowers inflation. And scarce power, sites and capital raise some prices against others, which need not raise prices in general. Inflation expected five to ten years ahead was 2.1% on 20 Nov 2026, inside the range of 1.5–3% it has kept to.

It is still an assumption. Core inflation was 3.1% over the year to Sep 2026. The run of our view takes it to fade at the pace it faded in 2024 and 2025. If it stays where it is, the same run leaves 9.1% of the US workforce out of work by mid-2032, against 8.6%. If it rises again by three points through 2028, the Federal Reserve's rate reaches 7.2% and 9.6% are out of work. If people come to expect the rise to last, as they did in the 1970s, the rate reaches 19% and 12.3% are out of work.

What would show it. Core inflation still near 3% in mid-2027 while unemployment rises. Inflation expected five to ten years ahead leaving the range of 1.5–3%. Pay per hour, after inflation, rising faster than output per hour, which would mean labour's share recovering.

The model counts no harm from inflation itself, only from what central banks do about it. These runs show what fighting a second wave could cost. The cost of letting one run is outside the model.

The runThe Federal Reserve's rate at its highestUS core inflation, end of 2028US out of work, mid-2032Outcome
Our view: inflation fades4.1% early 20272.1%8.6%, risingA deep recession
Inflation stays where it is4.2% mid-20272.6%9.1%, risingA deep recession
Inflation rises again: a second wave7.2% early 20295.6%9.6%, risingA deep recession
A second wave, and people half expect it to last10.3% mid-20297.1%10.2%, risingA deep recession
A second wave, and people expect it to last19.4% the third quarter of 202911.0%12.3%, risingA deep recession

The second wave is assumed: three percentage points more inflation by the start of 2028, in every economy, held through 2028 and gone by the start of 2030. Each run opens in the model, where inflation and what people expect of it can be set.

Market context

Market prices move for many reasons. These are shown for context and never count as evidence for our view.

What the view does not claim

A date for the long run. The research behind this site shows where wages and rents tend as machines take over work; it puts no years on it, and the view stops in mid-2032.

Numbers for Europe. The view is stated for the United States, and no point rests on the model's figures for other economies.

A call on which way US government bonds move in the downturn. In most downturns their yields fall; with large deficits and a build-out competing for savings they might not. We show both and count neither.

How sure we are

This is our view, and it could be wrong. The loss of jobs to AI measured so far is small and could stay small: at the pace seen so far, the same run has 5.8% of the US workforce out of work by mid-2032, and with no fall in shares as well, 5.7%, a slowdown without a recession. How fast the pace grows is assumed, not measured. The model, fitted to past downturns, may not fit this one; with no fall in shares and no jobs lost to AI its unemployment rate still drifts from 4.2% to 4.7% by mid-2032, so its later years lean high. The settings and the model are public: the code for this run.

Behind the headline numbers: twelve measures fixed in advance