Indicators
16 predictions set on 8 Oct 2026, all still open. Next deadlines: Dec 2026 (US unemployment, Swedish unemployment, Technology stocks, Financial stress and Bank lending to non-bank lenders).
Jobs and pay
Jobs in work AI can already do. The argument predicts: Jobs in work AI can already do fall as a share of all jobs while output grows, and graduates fare worse than non-graduates. At the pace measured so far the change is slow, and for a year or two it may stay within the surveys' margin of error. Other possible causes: Recoveries, in which physical and less-educated work comes back faster after a recession has cut it (2021); a downturn in the technology industry, which cuts information jobs (2001–02). First stated: 4 Sep 2026 for graduates; 24 Sep 2026 for office jobs.
- Office jobsDirect evidence · Prediction: their growth minus that of all jobs, −0.50 points in Oct 2026, to reach −2.41 points or below by Sep 2028−0.5 ptsNormal
- Graduates' unemployment0.68×Chart only
Output growing faster than pay. The argument predicts: Labour's share of output falls by about two points a year or more, and productivity grows faster than real pay, with no recession and no jump in the prices businesses charge. Other possible causes: Recoveries from recession and jumps in the prices businesses charge also lower the share for a while (2009, 2022). First stated: 9 Aug 2026, in the paper.
- Labour's share of business outputDirect evidence · Prompted the view · Prediction: the share, 93.73 in Q3 2026, to reach 91.45 or below by Q2 202793.7Triggered
- Productivity and pay+1.1 ptsChart only
Households
What happens to people who lose their jobs. The argument predicts: Employment among 25–54-year-olds falls while their unemployment rate stays level, and health care and social assistance keep hiring while private jobs outside them stop growing. Other possible causes: Recoveries in which hiring lags, an ageing population, or government hiring and job cuts. First stated: 9 Aug 2026, in the paper, for people leaving the workforce; 4 Sep 2026, in the project's design notes, for care.
- People leaving the workforceDirect evidence · Prompted the view · Prediction: two-year change in the employment rate, −0.30 points in Oct 2026, to reach −0.40 points or below by Sep 2028−0.30 ptsClose to triggering
- Private jobs outside careDirect evidence · Prediction: jobs added over a year, 424 thousand in Oct 2026, to reach zero or below by Sep 2027+424kNormal
Household income and spending. The argument predicts: Wages fall as a share of household income while employment stays level. Other possible causes: In a recession, wage income falls along with employment. First stated: 24 Sep 2026, in the model.
AI investment and markets
AI investment and how it is financed. The argument predicts: Imports of computer hardware grow fast, and borrowing and bank credit lines to lenders outside the banking system rise and then fall. Other possible causes: The usual cycle in memory chips or in business investment. First stated: 2 Sep 2026, in the project's design notes.
- Korea's exportsDownturn signal · Prediction: yearly change, 67.8% in Aug 2026, to reach zero or below by Mar 2027+68%Normal
- Bank lending to non-bank lendersDownturn signal · Prediction: 13-week change, 4.7% on 28 Oct 2026, to reach −3.0% or below by 30 Dec 2026$2.11tnNormal
A fall in technology shares and corporate credit. The argument predicts: Shares and corporate bonds most exposed to AI fall first, in a decline like the dot-com crash. Other possible causes: Falls in share prices caused by rising interest rates (2022), and rises in borrowing costs unrelated to AI (2010–11). First stated: 24 Sep 2026, in the model.
- Technology stocksDownturn signal · Prediction: the Nasdaq's fall from its high, −10.9% on 6 Nov 2026, to reach −20.0% or below by 31 Dec 2026−10.9%Normal
- Corporate creditDownturn signal · Prediction: three-month change in the extra yield, −0.04 points on 5 Nov 2026, to reach 0.56 points or above by 31 Mar 20271.57 ptsNormal
- Financial stressDownturn signal · Prediction: the index, −0.52 on 30 Oct 2026, to reach 1.00 or above by 25 Dec 2026−0.52Normal
The labour market
Unemployment starts to rise. The argument predicts: Unemployment starts to rise within a few months of a market crash, and the jobs lost in work exposed to AI are not regained. Other possible causes: Every recession triggers these signals, and most of the jobs lost are later regained. First stated: 24 Sep 2026, in the model.
- US unemploymentDownturn signal · Prediction: rise above its low of the past year, 0.00 points in Oct 2026, to reach 0.50 points or above by Dec 20264.1%Normal
- US jobless claimsDownturn signal · Prediction: rise above their low of the past year, −1.1% on 31 Oct 2026, to reach 25.0% or above by 27 Mar 2027195kNormal
- Permanent job lossesDownturn signal · Prediction: yearly change in their share of the unemployed, −1.9 points in Oct 2026, to reach 5.0 points or above by Mar 202725%Normal
- US hiringDownturn signal · Prediction: yearly change in continuing claims, −12.4% on 24 Oct 2026, to reach 10.0% or above by 27 Mar 20273.4%Normal
- US mortgage arrearsDownturn signal · Prediction: yearly change in the arrears rate, 0.08 points in Q2 2026, to reach 0.40 points or above by Q1 20271.86%Normal
- Swedish unemploymentDownturn signal · Prediction: rise above its low of the past year, 0.27 points in Sep 2026, to reach 0.60 points or above by Dec 20268.6%Normal
- Factory and warehouse jobsContext · Set 24 Sep 2026+0.6%Normal
How severe the downturn becomes. The argument predicts: A market crash and rising unemployment at the same time; then job losses that last; then policies that deepen the downturn, such as tariffs and spending cuts. Other possible causes: Any recession brings falling markets and rising unemployment at the same time, and a bust in one industry, such as the dot-com bust, can leave its jobs below their earlier level while output recovers. First stated: 24 Sep 2026, in the model.
- Market fall and job losses togetherDownturn signal · Set 8 Oct 2026no signals onNormal
- Office jobs not regained after a downturnDirect evidence · Set 8 Oct 2026no downturn yetNormal
Public finances and policy
Public finances and government borrowing costs. The argument predicts: Receipts from taxes on wages fall first; then the extra return investors demand to hold government debt rises in countries whose budgets rely on taxes on wages, while growth slows. At the pace measured so far this is years away. Other possible causes: For taxes on wages, changes in tax law; for borrowing costs, budget politics in one country, or a worldwide rise in bond yields while employment is stable. First stated: 2 Sep 2026, in the project's design notes.
- Taxes on wagesDirect evidence · Prediction: yearly change as a share of GDP, −0.00 points of GDP in Q3 2026, to reach −0.14 points of GDP or below by Q4 20286.30%Normal
- Government borrowing costs in a US downturnDirect evidence · Two rules set 8 Oct 2026; that day, one was close to triggering+4 basis pointsNormal
- Euro-area borrowing costsContext · Set 8 Oct 2026, close to triggeringFranceTriggered
- France's borrowing costsContext · Five rules set 24 Sep 2026; that day, one was already triggered and one close to triggering151 basis pointsTriggered
The policy response. The argument predicts: Tariffs, spending cuts as unemployment rises, and inflation expectations moving outside their usual range. Other possible causes: In calm times, tariffs and expected inflation move for reasons unrelated to the argument. First stated: 2 Sep 2026, in the project's design notes; for tariffs, 25 Sep 2026, in Our view.
- The US tariff rate5.54%Chart only
- Long-run inflation expectationsContext · Set 24 Sep 20262.17%Normal
Market context
Market prices move for many reasons, and in the model, markets respond to AI's effect on work only after a delay.
- Ten-year yields in six marketsChart only
- The premium on US government debtContext · Set 25 Sep 2026, already triggered0.91 ptsNormal
- Sudden moves in bond yieldsContext · 12 rules set 24 Sep 2026; that day, two were already triggered and three close to triggeringClose to triggering
- Expected interest ratesContext · Three rules set 24 Sep 2026Normal
- Oil pricesContext · Set 25 Sep 2026, already triggered$107Normal
- US mortgage ratesContext · Set 25 Sep 2026, already triggered7.18%Close to triggering
- US house pricesContext · Set 25 Sep 2026+2.1%Normal
- The yenContext · Set 25 Sep 2026¥157Normal
- Japan's bond yields2.68%Chart only